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Discussions of the causal status of race focus on the question of whether
race itself can be experimentally manipulated. Yet many experiments test-
ing for racial discrimination do not manipulate race, but rather a signal
by which race influences an outcome. Such signal manipulations are eas-
ily formalized, though contexts of discrimination introduce an additional
issue. Whether a signal counts as a signal for race is not merely a causal
question, but depends on sociological and normative issues regarding dis-
crimination. The notion of signal manipulation enables one to take these
issues into account while still using causal counterfactual tests to detect
discrimination.
1 Introduction
Discrimination is, in part, a causal concept. The claim that an individual was
discriminated against based on her race entails that her race made a difference to
how she was treated. Yet there is currently a great deal of perplexity surrounding
causal claims involving demographic variables such as race. The problem arises
within the methodology of causal inference, which evaluates causal claims us-
ing counterfactuals concerning the results of “manipulating” a purported cause
for an individual, while keeping her other properties fixed. But it is doubtful
whether there are hypothetical manipulations that change only a person’s race,
while keeping all other factors fixed. This concern has been taken seriously by
social scientists studying discrimination. The three dominant proposals address-
ing this have been 1) to claim that the relevant manipulation is not on race, but
on the discriminator’s perception of race (Greiner and Rubin, 2011), 2) to claim
that race is a cluster concept and that the relevant manipulations are on its
components (Sen and Wasow, 2016), and 3) to deny that counterfactual causal
methods are suitable for modeling discrimination (Kohler-Hausmann, 2018).
None of these approaches can account for the way that discrimination is em-
pirically tested, even for simple experimental designs. Consider Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2004), who sent out resumes assigned either stereotypically black
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or white names and measured the difference in callback rates for otherwise sim-
ilar candidates. What is manipulated here is not the person’s race, but the way
that information about race is transmitted to the employer. The “perception of
race” proposal captures this, but introduces unnecessary complications about
what it means to manipulate perceptions, while avoiding necessary questions
about why the actual manipulation (i.e. on the name) is suitable. The second
proposal would treat the racial-soundingness of a name as a part of the cluster-
concept of race. This misses the fact that the name functions not as a part of
race, but as a proxy for it. The third proposal emphasizes that the experiment
cannot explain why certain categories such as race merit specific legal protec-
tions against discrimination, which make sense only in the context of broader
social and historical patterns of discrimination. This is correct, but does not
entail that the experiment is therefore not suitable for detecting discrimination.
A great deal of confusion can be avoided by gaining a clearer understanding
of the type of manipulation involved in the experiment. The core idea is simple:
although the experiment manipulates the name on the resume, this manipula-
tion is informative only because the name is treated as a reliable signal for a
person’s race. This is in some sense obvious – the purpose of the experiment is
not to test for name discrimination, but race discrimination. But this feature of
the experiment has not been discussed systematically, and is in fact non-trivial
to reconcile with features of causal methodology. Notably, manipulations, when
formally modeled as interventions on variables in a causal model, make a vari-
able no longer depend on its causes other than the intervention. However, the
value of name on the resume derives from its carrying information about race,
and this informational link would be destroyed by such an intervention. We see
that such manipulations, which I call signal manipulations, behave differently
from standard manipulations, and thus call for their own analysis.
One might worry that the signal manipulation proposal commits one to a
problematically realist view of race. Assuming race is socially constructed, how
can one talk about race independently of its signals? I will argue that this worry
is ill founded: the social constructedness of race does not entail that the relevant
construct must reduce to its various manifestations. What this means for the
causal status of race is a complicated question that I will only begin to evaluate
here. I will suggest that whether it makes sense to causally model race varies
based on the scenario and the particular normative and/or empirical context.
My proposal will help explain why one can talk sensibly about race causally in
some cases and why it is problematic in others. This will offer a way towards
a deeper exploration what makes race causally complicated, without throwing
into doubt the ability to test for (at least certain kinds of) discrimination using
well-designed experiments.
2 Manipulability
The starting point of this discussion is a rather technical methodological issue:
Although it is common to test and analyze causal claims in terms of whether
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one can influence the effect by manipulating the cause in a particular way, it is
unclear if demographic variables such as race can be so manipulated (Holland,
1986; Glymour, 2007; Holland, 2008; VanderWeele and Robinson, 2014; Gly-
mour and Glymour, 2014; Pearl, 2018). For readers interested in exploring race
in all of its sociological and normative complexity, this technical focus might
initially come as a disappointment. Nevertheless, there is a great deal to be
learned from juxtaposing methodological questions about how to empirically
detect racial discrimination with sociological/normative questions about what
race is and what makes racial discrimination distinctively wrong. Two of the
analyses we will consider (Sen and Wasow, 2016; Kohler-Hausmann, 2018) claim
that manipulations on race make sense only if it is biologically real (as opposed
to socially constructed). I believe that the connection between what race is and
whether it is manipulable is not nearly as tight as suggested by these analyses.
Clarifying these issues will require some background regarding what is at stake
in debates over manipulability and why race is supposedly not manipulable.
This section will provide this background.
I will use the terms “manipulation” and “intervention” interchangeably,
though I note that the term “manipulation” often suggests a concrete change
to a system, while the term “intervention” is preferable when discussing more
abstract formal characterizations of such changes. Ideal interventions are a
paradigm example of such a characterization. An ideal intervention on a vari-
able sets that variable’s value in such a way that it depends only on the in-
tervention, rather than on its other causes. Such interventions are useful for
addressing the problem of “confounding” (Pearl, 2009, ch. 6). As a standard
illustration: a strong correlation between smoking and cancer might indicate
not that smoking causes cancer, but merely that those with a propensity to
develop lung cancer are also more likely to smoke. To rule out this possibility,
one can intervene to make test participants smoke whether or not they would
otherwise. In a randomized control trial this would be accomplished by ran-
domly assigning subjects to either smoke or not smoke. The result of this is
that learning whether a participant smokes provides one with no information
about their properties – and thus about their propensity to develop lung cancer
– and thus any remaining correlation between smoking and cancer reveals that
smoking causes cancer.
Beyond their experimental utility, interventions have been central to the
analysis of causation, since genuine causal relationships may be distinguished
from merely probabilistic ones in terms of the former enabling one to predict
the results of interventions (Woodward, 2003). Some philosophers might dis-
miss interventions as being of “merely” methodological significance, and thus of
little relevance for understanding what causation is. Such philosophers would
readily accept the existence of causes that cannot manipulated as evidence that
the set of causes in the world is wider than the set of variables that one can
intervene upon and thus might dismiss what follows as being of interest only to
those adopting a controversial “interventionist” view of causation. As a prelim-
inary response, it is crucial to clarify that the concept of an intervention applies
even in cases where human agents cannot intervene for practical or ethical rea-
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sons. Although the ethics research board won’t permit interventions to make
people smoke, it is clear enough what such an experiment would look like. The
Federal Reserve would not randomly intervene upon the economy, but clever
researchers will seek naturally occurring “instrumental” variables that play the
same evidential role as interventions (Angrist et al., 1996). What matters in
principle is how variables would respond to interventions, rather than whether
such interventions are feasible.
Still, why think that the set of causes should be at all delimited by the set
of manipulable variables? The position I adopt here is not that there cannot
be non-manipulable causes (I remain agnostic on this point), but rather that
certain types of non-manipulability threaten the intelligibility of viewing the
variable in question as a cause. Taking a step back, questions about whether
some relationship is causal only make sense relative to an implied contrast re-
garding what it would be for it not to be causal. In the well-understood case
of the randomized trial, we are interested in whether someone’s taking a drug
brought about a certain outcome, or, instead, whether learning that someone
took a drug is merely evidence that they would be likely to recover. The key
to randomization is that because the treatment and control groups – e.g. the
groups that received the drug as opposed to the placebo – differ only in their
treatment status, one can take the outcome in the control group as reflecting
the outcome that the members of the treatment group would have had (on av-
erage) had they received the control (and vice versa). This works only because
it is possible to vary one property, while keeping the distribution of all other
properties the same across the groups, and this possibility underlies interven-
tions more generally. At the extreme, imagine that it were impossible to vary
whether an individual was in one group or another without varying all prop-
erties of the individuals across the groups. It would arguably no longer make
sense to ask whether the group an individual is in is causally or evidentially
relevant to a particular outcome. Had she been in the other group, she would
have been an entirely different individual. In such a case, the impossibility of
characterizing an intervention on group status is not just a pragmatic limitation,
but rather reflects that a standard basis for conceptually differentiating causal
from non-causal relationships is inapplicable.
Discussions of whether demographic variables are manipulable are sometimes
posed as metaphysical questions about whether it is possible to change some-
one’s race or gender compatibly with their being the same person. But the real
issue is not metaphysical identity, but rather whether the variable in question
can be manipulated independently of other variables characterizing an individ-
ual (Weinberger, 2015). If it made sense to talk about changing a person’s race
independent of their other properties, then the question of whether they would
count as the same individual would be of no further relevance to whether race is
manipulable. Of course, it remains far from clear that it does make sense to talk
about changing race in this way. This is why the question arises as to whether
and how one can experimentally test for its purported effects. Nevertheless,
the discussion has already yielded an insight that will be crucial for evaluating
proposals for causally understanding race. Namely, whether it makes sense to
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reason about race causally boils down to whether it is possible to reason about
variation in race independently of variation in an individual’s other properties.
In the context of empirically modeling racial discrimination there is often
little need to answer unrestricted questions about how a person would have
been different had they been of a different race. It would already be progress
if we could clarify what it would mean for race to influence how a person is
treated in particular discriminatory contexts. Even given a simplistic view of
race, however, it is non-trivial to clarify how the effects of race are measured
in a particular context. Marcellesi (2013) imagines a fictional experiment in
which one intervenes on a fetus’ genes in utero to change the future child’s race
(understood biologically). Even supposing that such an intervention made sense,
it is clearly not the intervention of interest in typical contexts of discrimination.
If one wants to know whether a job candidate who was denied a position last
week was discriminated against, what we are manifestly not asking is whether
she would have gotten the position had she spent her whole life as a person of a
different race. Plausibly, such an intervention would change many facts about
her life trajectory, making it unlikely that she would even end up applying for
the job. We see that even if one is willing to conceptualize race in a limited way
such that it can be manipulated, one needs to further show that the envisioned
manipulation is relevant for establishing a certain type of discrimination.
In many contexts where a variable is said to be “non-manipulable” the issue
is not that there is no intervention one could perform on it, but rather that
there are too many distinct interventions. This might not be an issue when the
intervened-upon variable can be characterized such in a way that its influence
on its effects is invariant across different versions of the intervention. But many
variables are not like this (Spirtes and Scheines, 2004). Regarding race, one
can imagine a range of experiments testing the effects of race in a particular
context, including interventions changing an individual’s external appearance,
interventions changing how that individual is viewed by others in a context,
and perhaps even interventions on whether the individual lives in a society with
racial disparities – to name just a few possibilities. Each of these corresponds
to a different experiment with different effects, and consequently one cannot
talk about intervening on race without clarifying which particular intervention
one has in mind. This problem suggests its own solution (Woodward, 2003,
p. 116-117): experimenters should limit themselves to only talking about race
in the context of particular interventions on race, and to avoid discussing race
without specifying particular interventions.
Although this disambiguation strategy is useful for generating manipula-
ble variables, it should be viewed only as the first step towards understanding
race and racial discrimination causally. Beyond specifying a manipulable race-
related variable, one must defend that the relevant intervention is a suitable one
for testing for racial discrimination. This is non-trivial, as we will presently see
when we look at existing proposals in the literature for modeling (or rejecting)
the manipulability of race. One basis for evaluating these proposals will be in
terms of their ability to account for audit studies in which the experimenter
varies a cue related to a person’s race to see how doing so impacts whether they
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are hired. Notably, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) sent out resumes ran-
domly assigned names that are perceived as stereotypically white or black to see
whether this impacted the fictional applicant’s chance of receiving a callback (it
did). Although this experiment only considers a particular type of employment
discrimination in a limited context – e.g. one in which there is no in-person
interaction – I take it to be a fairly clean cut test of racial discrimination. One
would therefore hope that existing proposals for the manipulability of race could
easily account for the relevant manipulation.
While the proposals to be discussed concern race, the issue of non-manipula-
bility arises also for other demographic variables, such as gender and age (Fosse
and Winship, 2019). Here I will focus on race, though in later discussions of
socially constructed variables, an occasional example involving gender will help.
Moreover, even with respect to race I will only consider certain types of pur-
ported effects. Specifically, I’ll emphasize types of discrimination that involve
agents or institutions “detecting” the races of individuals. This is what is at
issue in many standard queries about employment discrimination and discrim-
ination by police. We will see that not all discrimination is like this. Some
discrimination (e.g. “redlining”)1 relies on indirect proxies for race (Prince and
Schwarcz, 2019), and broader patterns of discrimination do not simply reduce
to the actions of agents or institutions. These issues are pressing, and are more
complicated that those considered here. This paper is motivated by my view
that existing proposals cannot even account for simple tests of discrimination
and that a better one is a prerequisite for clarifying more complicated scenarios.
3 Problems with Existing Solutions
3.1 Greiner and Rubin: Race as Perception of Race
Greiner and Rubin (2011) propose that instead of treating race itself as a cause,
experiments on discrimination should be understood as manipulating the dis-
criminator’s perception of race. This proposal clearly gets something right. In
audit experiments, one is interested in whether the candidate would have been
called back had the employer thought they were of a different race, not whether
they had been a different race. And it is a virtue of the proposal that it lo-
cates discrimination not in some allegedly intrinsic feature of the individual,
but rather in how others respond to that individual. The problems with the
proposal arise once one takes seriously the claim that what is being manipu-
lated is a particular individual’s perception. What does it mean to manipulate
a mental state? What if there are multiple perceivers making the hiring deci-
sion? When is “the moment the decider first perceives a unit’s race” (Greiner
and Rubin, 2011, p. 775)? The point is not that one could not find answers to
these nitty-gritty questions, but rather that these questions are irrelevant. In a
1“Redlining” refers to financial institutions treating zip codes predominantly containing
minorities differently from zip codes that do not, thereby discriminating against minorities
without explicitly taking minority-status into account at the decision-making level.
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Figure 1: Discrimination DAG
well-designed audit study measuring callbacks, we simply do not need to know
how many people were on the hiring committee to judge whether discrimination
is occurring. The manipulation was not directly on anyone’s mental state, but
(e.g.) on the name on the resume.
Further questions arise if one takes the proposal as offering the variable
perception of race as a replacement for race. Consider the plausible if simplis-
tic model for audit studies in figure 1. The model posits a person’s race as
potentially influencing whether a candidate is hired via two paths (sets of con-
nected causal arrows). First, prior discrimination may have led the candidate
to be denied opportunities to develop job-relevant qualifications, resulting in
the candidate being denied the job due to lacking these qualifications. This is
represented by the indirect path from race to qualifications to is hired. Second,
the candidate may be not hired due to the employer identifying their race. This
is represented by a direct path in the model, but we could just as easily have
included an indirect path through a variable for the name on the application.
Pearl (2001) presents this model to illustrate that when evaluating discrimi-
nation, what matters is not whether race has any effect on being hired, but
rather whether it influences being hired by the direct path (i.e. holding quali-
fications fixed). Note that in this model, one cannot just replace the variable
race with perception of race. Although perception of race can plausibly describe
what is happening along the direct path, the current hirer’s perception of the
candidate’s race has nothing to do with why the candidate has her current qual-
ifications. Although the issue here traces in part to the simplicity of the model,
the lesson generalizes. One cannot simply replace race with some particular
operationalization of race and assume that one’s models will still be coherent.
Even in relatively simple experiments, it will be important to keep track of both
race as well as the way that it influences a particular outcome.
It would be too much to demand that in order to include race as a variable
in a causal model, one must ensure that the defined variable reflects the concept
of race in all of its sociological complexity. We should be willing to consider the
effects of race at particular times, for particular durations, and in particular con-
texts, while acknowledging that any particular experiment will only correspond
to one piece of the puzzle. One might imagine that doing so would make the
methodologist’s job very easy: for each experiment, one should just be clear how
one is defining the race variable(s), perhaps with the appropriate subscripts. We
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now see that this is not so trivial. There is obviously something correct in the
claim that audit studies concern the perception of race. Nevertheless, Greiner
and Rubin’s proposal, as it stands, does little to spell out the details about
how race is modeled within experiments. While models – causal or otherwise –
run the risk of oversimplifying a complex scenario, the rewards come from their
forcing the researcher to spell out their assumptions in a rigorous way. Greiner
and Rubin fall short in this respect.
3.2 Sen and Wasow: Race as a Bundle of Sticks
Sen and Wasow (2016) propose that instead of attempting to define a single
race variable that can be manipulated, race should instead be defined as a
cluster property consisting of an aggregate set of elements, some of which can
be manipulated in particular experiments. The guiding analogy is that race
is a “bundle of sticks”, where race corresponds to the whole bundle and the
sticks correspond to its aggregate elements. As is evident from their choice of
metaphor, their account is not designed to say anything about the relationship
between the sticks and the bundle, or to provide a basis for theorizing which
elements should count as being in the bundle at all. They do suggest that
some elements of the bundle are more mutable than others, and thus more
manipulable (507). Yet clearly the aim of the account is not to provide a unified
framework for thinking about the relationship between the different elements of
race, but rather to emphasize that race consists of many elements and that only
a subset of elements will be under consideration in any particular study.
Sen and Wasow present their account as clarifying how the effects of race are
tested in a range of experiments, including the audit experiments emphasized
here. They go beyond Greiner and Rubin by distinguishing between race and
its elements, but are unable to provide a satisfactory account of how these relate
to one another. For instance, they explain audit experiments by saying that the
manipulated “stick” (the cue) is a proxy for race. But proxies are not parts of
the entities they represent, but distinct from them. Such mixing of metaphors
would be harmless if Sen and Wasow offered an independent account of what
determines which sticks counts as part of the bundle, but they do not. This
leaves them without resources for explaining why the manipulations performed
in discrimination experiments are the relevant ones to perform. The actual
manipulations are on the sticks themselves, while the bundle itself is an idle
wheel doing no explanatory or modeling work. In contrast, talk of proxies
correctly captures the fact that audit studies vary cues such as the name on the
resume to alter the racially-relevant information that is transmitted to the hirer.
This, of course, invites the question of what it means for a cue to carry such
information. The proxy metaphor nevertheless contrasts favorably with that of
a bundle of sticks, which by design says nothing about the sticks’ relationships
to each other or to the bundle as a whole.
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For other types of experiments, Sen and Wasow describe the sticks not as
proxies for but as constitutive elements of race. But the shortcomings are simi-
lar: the proposal does not allow one to ask what makes something a constituent
of race. One might suppose that this limitation could be rectified by appeal
to the philosophical literature presenting constitutive explanations – in which
components jointly explain the functioning of a whole mechanism – as an sup-
plement to standard causal explanations (Craver, 2007). In the event that this
paragraph is not cut as part of the reviewing process, I feel compelled to share
my view that this literature is a muddled mess that pretends to be rigorous,
while failing to solve any problem that is not of its own making.2 While talk
of constitutive explanations is now too entrenched within philosophy of biology
and neuroscience to disappear any time soon, I would seek to dissuade method-
ologists who are unsatisfied with causal treatments of race from presuming that
this literature provides novel tools for addressing their problems.
I suspect that the appeal of Sen and Wasow’s position derives from an under-
lying assumption that since race is a social construct, one cannot legitimately
model it as independent of its social manifestations. My suggestion that the
manipulated variables are not parts of race but rather proxies would thus be re-
jected as relying on a contentious claim that race has an existence independent
of its proxies. In section 5, however, I will argue that this underlying assumption
is wrong. The social constructedness of race does not entail that race should
not be modeled independently of its proxies.
3.3 Kohler-Hausmann: Abandon the Causal Approach
Sen and Wasow take for granted that whether race can be manipulated is closely
related to whether race is a biologically essential feature of individuals, rather
than socially constructed. Kohler-Hausmann (2018) provides an argument in
favor of there being such a connection. Specifically, she argues that counterfac-
tual causal tests for discrimination are incompatible with understanding race
as socially constructed. Her view overlaps with Sen and Wasow’s insofar as she
talks about how race is “constituted”. But her aim in doing so is not to de-
compose race into components that can be individually manipulated, but rather
to argue that because it is constituted by a complex set of social relationships,
localized counterfactual tests are unsuitable for detecting racial discrimination
in experimental contexts. Kohler-Hausmann’s discussion contains a wealth of
insights that will be central to the subsequent discussion. In this section, how-
ever, my aim is to rebut her claim that the counterfactual approach presupposes
the biological reality of race.
To illustrate her thesis that counterfactual approaches are inappropriate for
evaluating socially constructed categories, Kohler-Hausmann describes a hypo-
thetical society stratified into two groups: Royals and Non-Royals. Royals are
identified by their wearing purple capes and carrying sticks, and are considered
2Romero (2015), while sympathetic to the mechanistic project, compellingly argues for
the inconsistency of its most rigorous existing formulation. Weinberger (2019) highlights why
such inconsistencies undermine the explanatory aims of the project.
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so above Non-Royals that the latter are expected to step off the sidewalk when
a Royal approaches. An anthropologist observing this society would miss the
significance of the Royal/Non-Royal distinction if they myopically focused on
the effects of capes on sidewalk behavior. The counterfactual “If I changed an
isolated trait about a person (cape, stick) and nothing else changed about that
person, would other pedestrians have remained on the sidewalk?” (p. 1180)
locates the disparate treatment in the behavior of individuals, while it is better
understood as a reflecting the social stratification of the society. Put differ-
ently, the answer to the question “why did the Non-Royal step into the road”
is not, “because she encountered a cape-wearer”, but “because she encoun-
tered a Royal” (cf. Dembroff et al., 2020). Being a Royal does not reduce to
the features used to identify Royals, but is a fact about the status attributed
to different groups within a society. Similarly, race is a social category, and
Kohler-Hausmann sees the counterfactual approach as a misguided attempt to
reduce it to superficial features such as skin color.
In modeling discrimination, the anthropologist’s lens is not the only one
that matters. Intervening to give a Non-Royal a cape and stick and seeing if
other Non-Royals defer to them would not tell the researcher why Royals are
privileged within the society. But it is a perfectly good test of whether Non-
Royals are being discriminated against in the particular context. Such a test
would not resolve the question of whether such discrimination is bad or what
makes it so, and thus would be of limited use to a lawmaker deciding whether to
design legal protections against it. But it would nevertheless be a vital test to
conduct if one was uncertain whether Royals and Non-Royals were being treated
differently on sidewalks. Contra Kohler-Hausmann, a category’s being socially
constructed does not mean that counterfactual tests are ill-suited for testing for
discrimination based on that category.
Throughout, Kohler-Hausmann conflates the issues of whether causal coun-
terfactuals provide an analysis of what discrimination is and why it is bad with
the issue of whether such counterfactuals are relevant to detecting discrimina-
tion, which is what she claims to be addressing. Before elaborating upon this
criticism, I should emphasize that there are cases in which counterfactual tests
are used to address the former issues, and for those her objections hit their mark.
Dembroff, Kohler-Hausmann, and Sugarman (2020) discuss a lawsuit pertaining
not to race but sex, and in particular whether protections based on sex also pro-
tect individuals based on sexual orientation. In particular, if a male employee is
fired for being married to a man, do we say either that A) he was discriminated
against based on sex, because had he been a woman married to a man he would
not have been fired or that B) he was not discriminated against based on sex,
but on sexual orientation, since had he been a woman in a heterosexual marriage
he would not have been fired. Each option appeals to a different counterfactual,
and which counterfactual to choose cannot be resolved by appeal to value-free
facts about the individual, but rather to social questions about whether sexual
orientation is part of the social category of sex, as well as normative questions
about why sex merits legal protections against discrimination. Moreover, social
context is necessary not only for selecting protected categories, but also for eval-
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uating what counts as part of a category. A study that sent male and female
candidates to a job interview wearing the same dress (Kohler-Hausmann, 2018,
p. 1216) would not be a suitable test for sex discrimination, as the candidates
would differ not just in their sex but in their conforming to sex-based norms.
Seeing this requires knowledge of the role of sex within society.
Kohler-Hausmann emphasizes that the counterfactual approach sheds little
light on what race is or what makes discrimination based on race – as opposed
to, e.g., having freckles – sufficiently bad to merit special constitutional protec-
tions. The answer to these questions is found not in facts about individuals,
but requires reference to broader social and historical patterns of discrimination.
Nevertheless, it does not follow that given assumptions about which categories
are protected, one cannot use counterfactual tests for detecting discrimination.
And it is not clear how one could do without such tests. An individual’s claim
to have been racially discriminated against would be undermined if they would
have been treated similarly even had they been of a different race.
4 Signal Manipulation
In testing whether Non-Royals defer to Royals, one does not manipulate whether
someone is a Royal, but whether someone has a cape and stick. This test only
works, however, if the cape and stick are reliable signals for royalty. If the Non-
Royal were not fooled into identifying the caped individual as Royal, she would
not defer to her. That said, if the disguise is convincing, the test does establish
an effect of royalty in this localized context. This effect is just one node in the
nexus by which the society reinforces its social structure. Yet even this local-
ized example has structure that eludes existing approaches to manipulability.
The test described requires that one attends to both the Royal status and its
signal, as well as their systematic relationship. Greiner and Rubin focus only
on the signal. Sen and Wasow cannot account for the systematic relationship.
Kohler-Hausmann recognizes the complexity and non-manipulability of status,
but denies that the effects of status are tested via the manipulation of signals.
The robe and stick are reliable signals for royalty insofar as they counterfac-
tually track one’s royalty status. Outside of the experiment, they correspond
to what one would have if and only if one were a Royal. Similarly, in Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2004), the name on the resume is only significant insofar as
it reliably tracks the applicant’s race. The study involves holding the individ-
ual’s qualifications and non-racially-identifying factors fixed while changing the
signal by which information about their race is transmitted.
Schematically, we can describe a signal-based manipulation with three vari-
ables, C for the category (e.g. race), S for the signal, and Y for the outcome
(i.e. the effect). S reliably tracks C, and this relationship obviously calls for
further elaboration. From the modeling perspective, the most crucial feature
of this relationship is that one can specify how S would counterfactually vary
given different values of C. A signal-based manipulation involves manipulating
S. But unlike with ideal interventions, one does not do so to render it fully in-
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dependent of its prior causes. Rather, one manipulates it to make it vary in the
way it would were C to have one value as opposed to another. So if C has two
values, c and c′, which are reliably tracked by the values s and s′, respectively,
then signal-based manipulations for the influence of C on Y would correspond
to the result of manipulating S from s to s′.
In Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), C is race (black or white), S is the
name, where certain names are treated as reliable signals of race, and Y is
whether the applicant gets a callback. To test for whether a black candidate
was discriminated against for being white, one changes the name from that
which the candidate would (and does) have as a result of being black to a name
they plausibly would have were they white. If this change in the name leads
to a change in the probability of getting a callback, this is taken to show that
race influences callback. In this manner, one tests for the effect of C on Y by
manipulating S.
For the rest of the section, I will further explore this proposal by pretending
that C were an ordinary cause of S and that this accounted for the counter-
factual dependence of the latter on the former. This resulting causal model
contains the path C → S → Y . In such a model, one could determine the effect
of C on Y via a signal manipulation of S. The ability to do so is at the center
of causal mediation techniques (Pearl, 2001; Imai et al., 2010), which measure
the way that an effect variable would respond to a change in a cause variable,
were that change to be transmitted via some causal paths but not others (Wein-
berger, 2019). For models with multiple paths between the cause and effect, the
definitions for the various effects along the different paths (e.g. direct and in-
direct effects) can become somewhat involved. For our purposes, the key facts
are that A) in the case where the only path between C and Y is via S, the total
effect of C on Y will just be its indirect effect via S, and B) indirect effects are
measured by signal manipulations of the mediators. This suffices to show that
the effect of C on Y can be established via a signal manipulation.
Recall that ideal interventions disrupt the relationship between the inter-
vened-upon variable and its causes other than the intervention. If one manip-
ulated the signal in this way, it would no longer function as a signal. Signals
convey information – typically about their causes or effects of their causes –
and ideal interventions break the causal connections by which this information
is transmitted. An intervention that assigns a person a name independent of
any other fact about them will, by design, render the name informationally in-
dependent of that person’s race. Signal manipulations do not work like this. In
selecting the contrastive values to which one intervenes to set the signal, one
assigns the values that would obtain given different instantiations of category C.
In this sense, the signal behaves as if it were tracking C. Nevertheless, it is not
tracking C (within the experiment), since its variation is not due to variation
in C. Although one changes the name on the resume from a black-sounding to
a white-sounding name, the applicant remains black.
Thinking about certain tests of discrimination as testing the “effect” of race
on some outcome via manipulating racial signals has several virtues. Most
obviously, it captures the fact that the manipulation is not on race itself, but
12
rather on a variable by which race influences an outcome. Nevertheless, the
effect of interest is not that of the manipulated variable, but rather of race.
This is reflected in the modeling insofar as one manipulates the signal in a way
as to mimic counterfactual changes in the value of C. More subtly, the fact that
the signal only matters as a proxy for the category is reflected in the fact that
the same effect could in principle be measured by manipulating distinct signals.
Consider again the model from figure 1, in which race influences being hired
via qualifications and via a direct path. Assuming that whether the employer
discriminated depends on whether there is an influence via the direct path,
it does not matter precisely which signal is manipulated, provided that one
manipulates a set of variables that are sufficient to account for the influence via
the path (i.e. if one were to include those variables in the model, there would be
no remaining direct path). This reflects the idea that it simply shouldn’t matter
precisely when a particular hirer perceived the applicant’s race or whether there
was one or multiple hirers. What matters is whether race made a difference for
employment not going through qualifications, not the precise avenue of influence.
Even in experiments in which the signal is is not directly manipulated, the
concept of a signal manipulation may be relevant. Consider the experimental
design of Grogger and Ridgeway (2006), which compared the racial disparity in
police traffic stops during day and during the night. The underlying assump-
tion was that during the night it would not be possible for police to identify the
driver’s race prior to stopping them, and thus the nighttime stop rates could
be used as a benchmark for what the disparity would be in the absence of dis-
crimination. If the disparity were higher during the day, this would be evidence
that race was being taken into account in decisions about which cars to stop.
Here there is no manipulation to make drivers appear to be of a different race.
One would be hard pressed to localize the variable being manipulated. But the
case is easily accounted for in terms of signal manipulation. If the assumption
underlying the design is correct, then the signals about drivers’ race are trans-
mitted during the day, but not at night. The experiment works by manipulating
whether the signal is transmitted.
We see that modeling the interventions as signal manipulations seems to
provide a fruitful way for thinking about how audit studies test for racial dis-
crimination. Yet the relationship between race and its signals has yet to be
properly explicated. Talk of the signal “reliably tracking” the category has
a causal ring to it. But without specifying what the race variable designates
we cannot say if it is manipulable, and we have thus replaced the question of
whether race is a cause of an outcome with that of whether race is a cause of its
signals. This might not initially seem like progress. The reason that it is is that
there is a story to be told about why certain variables are only manipulable via
their signals. Telling this story will bring into focus the genuine reasons why
interventions on race are problematic.
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5 Race and Manipulability: A New Lens
Earlier I noted a common – if implicit – assumption that since race is just a social
construct, causal descriptions of it must reduce it to its social manifestations.
This is what makes it sound plausible to say that race just is perception of
race, or that it is nothing more than a bundle of sticks. But the underlying
assumption is false. That race is a social construct does not imply that it
reduces to its social manifestations. Seeing why is crucial for understanding the
ways in which it does and does not behave like a cause.
Consider the question of whether a work of art was bought for a high price
because it was authentic (as opposed to a forgery). The fact that original paint-
ings are considered so much more valuable than near-indistinguishable forgeries
is a societal fact about how art is valued. In this sense, the authenticity of a
work of art is a social construct. There is little doubt about whether authenticity
influences price and there are strong institutional mechanisms for ensuring the
reliability of signals about a work’s authenticity. Yet, if there were any doubt
about the effects of authenticity on price, it would be impossible to test this by
intervening to transform a forgery into the real thing. Rather one would have
to manipulate the signals for authenticity and see the effect on price. But this
does not mean that authenticity reduces to these signals. Although the value of
authenticity is a social construct, within the socially-constructed theory of value
what matters ultimately is not whether people believe an artwork is authentic,
but whether it is so.
Something subtle is going on here. On one level, it makes no sense to talk
about the value of authenticity independent of the beliefs of the community of
individuals who value it. Yet I claim that what matters is whether a work is
authentic, rather than merely whether individuals believe it to be so. To see why
this is not a contradiction, one must distinguish between whether the concept
of authenticity depends on the existence of certain beliefs and the content of
those beliefs. Part of this content is that there is a fact of the matter about
whether a work of art is authentic, whether or not people in fact believe it to
be so. Accordingly, it is intelligible to talk about people having false beliefs
about a work’s authenticity. Understood properly, this way of talking allows
for a distinction between authenticity and beliefs about authenticity, without
committing one to the view that authenticity exists independently of the society
within which it is valued.
The general point is that the claim that a property is a social construct
whose influence can only be tested by manipulating its signals does not entail
that it should be understood as being equivalent to those signals. One can (and
should) distinguish between the property itself and the signals by which it is
detected.
With this in mind, let’s revisit the suggestion that race should be under-
stood as perception of race. This suggestion is potentially ambiguous. On the
one hand, it might just indicate that race is not an intrinsic feature of an indi-
vidual, but depends on how one is perceived within a society. Alternatively, it
might suggest that all that matters is whether a person is perceived as being of
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a certain race, whether or not they are of that race. This second interpretation
is much less plausible, and one should not take it as following from the first. If
a white candidate were denied a job because the employer mistakenly believed
they were black, we would not say that they were discriminated against based
on race. This is so even though their perceived race might match that of a
black candidate who was discriminated against based on an accurate perception
of their race. This feature of linguistic practice makes sense within a society in
which people’s perceptions of race fairly reliably track the way that an individ-
ual is categorized within the society, and where the ability to detect race in this
manner is an important component of how discrimination functions within that
society. The point is not that individuals are never mistreated based on false
racial identifications, but rather that these aberrant cases are not really what is
at issue when studying (or designing legal protections to counteract) the phe-
nomenon of people who are discriminated against based on accurate perceptions
of their socially-constructed race.3
There is an apparent tension between my claim that signals must reliably
track the category and the fact that signal manipulations vary the signal without
also changing the category. In the artwork example, when one tests the effect
of authenticity by seeing what buyers would offer for an authentic painting that
is listed as a forgery, one is making it the case that the signal fails to reliably
track what it is supposed to. The key to resolving this tension is that the
possibility of altering the reliability of the signal within the contrived scenario
of the experiment does not undermine its reliability outside of the experimental
context. In fact, the reason why the signal manipulation is deemed relevant to
understanding the behavior of the category outside of the experiment is precisely
because one manipulates the signal in the experiment to what it would be in the
real world under the condition in which the category would be different from
what it is. The experiment in which a genuine artwork is signaled to be a forgery
is informative precisely because the signal in the experiment corresponds to the
one that would be manifest in the actual world were the artwork to be a forgery.
Of course, the question of what makes someone count as being of a certain
race is by no means as clear cut as that of what makes a work of art authentic,
3The idea that socially-mediated causal relations implicitly rule out certain types of aber-
rant cases is evident from an example by Prescott-Couch (2017). Georgina is a student who
is stigmatized as a result of having a birthmark covering half her face and as a result of
the stigmatization is distressed. Intuitively, the birthmark causes her being distressed via –
and, we could imagine, only via – stigmatization. So it seems like the causal model should be
birthmark → stigmatization → distress. This model entails that if one were to hold stigmatiza-
tion fixed, intervening on the birthmark would not have any effect on distress. Prescott-Couch
then considers the scenario in which one intervenes to remove Georgina’s birthmark, while
holding fixed the fact that she is mercilessless teased by her classmates for having one. The
Twilight Zone-esque scenario in which she is teased for a birthmark she doesn’t have would
be distressing indeed – and presumably in a different way and to a different degree than in the
scenario where she in fact has a birthmark. Nevertheless, Prescott-Couch compellingly resists
the conclusion that (contra the proposed model) the birthmark does have a direct effect on
distress not via stigmatization. Rather, to the extent we are interested in the social effects of
having a birthmark in the ordinary scenario, the aberrant Twilight Zone scenario need not be
considered.
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and we should expect a fair amount of vagueness in racial characterizations.
But none of this undermines the possibility of distinguishing between what
race is (within a society) and how it is perceived in particular contexts. Race
corresponds to a status that individuals are understood to have independent of
its particular manifestations by which it is detected. The racial signals have the
effects they do because they are taken as signals for the relevant social status.
Even though one can only manipulate race via its signals, this does not mean
that race is nothing over and above its signals.
Kohler-Hausmann presents a criticism of the Greiner and Rubin proposal
that may seem to carry over to the signal manipulation approach. She claims
that if race is a multifaceted social construct, then the perception of race will
be so as well, implying that their proposal only gets off the ground if one iden-
tifies race with superficial features such as skin color. Whatever the merits of
this criticism for the Greiner and Rubin proposal, it does not touch the signal
manipulation approach. Even granting that race is a social construct, one is not
required see race as identical to – or constituted by – the signals by which it is
identified.
6 When is it Fruitful to Model Race Causally?
Contra Kohler-Hausmann, the fact that race is a social construct does not rule
out the possibility of detecting race by intervening on its signals. In fact, her
Royals example provides a good illustration of precisely such an intervention.
We’ve seen that the relationship between race and its signals does not behave
like an ordinary causal relationship, but I’ve argued that this should not stand
in the way of using signal manipulations to test claims about the effects of race.
In this section, I consider one final objection, which claims that the challenges
that stand in the way of manipulating race carry over to manipulations on its
purported signals. Through addressing this objection, I will provide a clearer
characterization of when it is and is not fruitful to model race causally.
Consider Kohler-Hausmann’s example of a test of gender discrimination in
which male and female candidates come to an interview in the same dress. This
test fails because in comparing genders we need not merely vary the gender of the
applicant, but also the associated gender-conforming behaviors. This furnishes a
nice example of how manipulations on gender may call for multiple simultaneous
interventions going beyond gender in its most narrow sense. Moreover, the
knowledge that one needs to manipulate the candidates’ outfits comes from a
broader understanding of how gender functions in society. This is worrisome for
the signal manipulation proposal, since the question of which factors need to be
varied to count as a suitable manipulation on race or gender applies just as much
to their signals as to the categories themselves. Bertrand and Mullainathan’s
audit study wouldn’t work if, after manipulating the name, the candidate’s race
could still be inferred from the neighborhood that they grew up in or the college
they attended. While the signal manipulation proposal promises to create space
between questions of what race is and questions of how one tests for its localized
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discriminatory effects, perhaps this is just an illusion. Perhaps all of the issues
that arise in trying to model manipulations on race itself simply reappear when
one seeks to spell out all of the variables that must be manipulated as part of a
signal manipulation.
This worry has some merit and in fact provides clues as to why in some
cases it may no longer make sense to think about certain demographic variables
causally. Fortunately, however, the problem does not generalize to all cases.
Distinguishing between the cases in which the problem can and cannot be ad-
dressed will thus be helpful for seeing why certain demographic variables only
sometimes can be treated causally.
Consider the question of whether in the first 2016 presidential debate Hillary
Clinton was treated unfairly because she was a woman. Although Clinton was
widely perceived as coming out ahead in the debate, Trump was deemed by many
observers to have performed adequately. Given the obvious disparity between
the knowledgeability of the candidates on issues of substance, it was fair to
wonder if the debate would have been deemed to be as close as it had been had
the gender roles been reversed. To test this, some academics commissioned a
play in which each candidate was played by an actor of the opposite gender, but
otherwise copied the candidates’ words verbatim, along with the accompanying
gestures (Reynolds, 2017). Surprisingly, many attendees of the play reacted
more negatively to the male “Clinton” than they had to the original. Why was
he smiling so much? And didn’t he seem a bit effeminate? These reactions are
informative, but we should be cautious in drawing inferences about the effects of
the candidates’ genders. How audience members react to a candidate’s smiling,
for example, is not independent of her gender.
In this particular example, there may be no meaningful way to resolve ques-
tions about the causal effects of Clinton’s gender. Once it becomes clear that
testing for the effects of gender would involve manipulations on any behaviors
or gestures that would be interpreted in a gendered way, one begins to wonder
what wouldn’t have to be manipulated. As the list of signals to be manipulated
becomes large and open-ended, the gap between the questions “how would she
have been treated had she been of a different gender?” and “how are politicians
of different genders treated within a society” narrows to the point of impercep-
tibility. To the extent one cannot distinguish between these two questions, the
informal and plausible claim that Clinton’s gender causally influenced how she
was treated cannot be given a rigorous justification.
Such issues are in no way limited to gender. Imagine an audit study involving
an in-person interview instead of just a resume submission. If the employer
selects a white candidate over a black candidate on the basis that the former
was more assertive, we should not immediately assume that race was not in play.
Even if we could know that assertiveness was the only difference, the employer
might have interpreted assertiveness more negatively when coming from a black
candidate. The Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) study is thus only able to
work as well as it does given a contrived scenario in which one can really make
it so that the employer has no knowledge of the candidate’s race (which itself
is randomly assigned to a resume). The lesson to draw from this is neither that
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the study has no relevance to in-person scenario, nor that there are not sensible
ways to further explore the causal impact of race in the in-person case. It seems
plausible that there exists a spectrum of scenarios ranging from the cases where
it is most feasible to isolate an effect of race via manipulation of a signal to
those in which race operates in such a holistic manner that such manipulations
are no longer coherent.
Earlier I suggested that the issue with manipulability of race wasn’t meta-
physical identity, but whether race could be manipulated independently of other
properties of an individual. In the context of signal manipulation, one does not
intervene on race, but rather on its signals. So the issue instead is whether
one can manipulate some signals independently of others. The justification for
manipulating some signals but not others need not be that the non-manipulated
signals do not relate to race. In the simple hiring model in figure 1, the appli-
cant’s qualifications do convey information about her race. The reason for only
considering the direct path in that scenario is that, in the particular context, we
would likely not treat an employer who took these qualifications into account as
discriminating against the candidate. In other words, although all paths in the
model are related to race, only some are relevant for establishing discrimination
in the particular context.
We see that whether it makes sense to evaluate a particular demographic
variable causally depends not just on the variable, but also on the particular
query. The more one asks specific questions about how particular individuals
were treated in localized and well-defined contexts, the better the chances one
will be able to provide a causal analysis. But there will, of course, be lots of
borderline cases and any empirical analysis will rely on certain idealizations
and simplifying assumptions about the influences of a variable in a context. In
light of this, the most pressing question is: what do we gain by this modeling
exercise of trying to model race causally? One could imagine Kohler-Hausmann
granting a great deal of what I’ve said here, but taking it as showing that the
counterfactual analysis only applies to idealized experimental scenarios. If what
we really care about is the broad sociological concept of race, and I’ve granted
that such sociological factors are necessary for specifying the manipulations
required for testing discrimination, why go through the effort of seeking out an
idealized case to which causal concepts apply?
My answer to this is that conceding that race cannot be modelled causally
would be crippling for any attempt to design legal protections against racial
discrimination. In typical hiring scenarios, there is nothing barring an employer
from eliminating a candidate from consideration based on brute dislike. To
designate race as a protected category, one must be capable of distinguishing
cases in which candidates are denied a position because of their race, rather than
as a result of such brute dislike. In the extreme scenario – the one that I’ve
deemed non-causal on the basis that one cannot differentiate among the signals
that are and are not signals for race – such a distinction is no longer tenable.
A remaining concern is that without being able to specify hypothetical ma-
nipulations of race, one cannot address concerns relevant to confounding. This is
especially pressing in contexts where one wants to separate the influence of race
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from closely related social categories such as class. Unfortunately, the signal
manipulation proposal contains no means for answering this question. The way
one chooses to manipulate a signal presupposes certain ways of thinking about
the race/class distinction rather than providing a novel way to draw it. But it
is not really clear that subtle issues regarding if and how one can differentiate
the influences of race and class within a society are to be addressed with partic-
ular experiments, or even sets of experiments. Here the tool kits of sociologists
and historians seem more directly relevant. I by no means want to deny the
urgency of these questions, or to foreclose the possibility that experiments have
some role to play in addressing them. Fortunately, however, we do not need to
definitively resolve them in order to make progress in the design of experiments
for detecting discrimination.
7 Conclusion
Instead of answering the question “is race a cause?”, I have here sought to de-
termine when it is fruitful to reason causally about race. Although many will
still desire an answer to the first question, I see the type of project started in
this paper as being essential for understanding both why manipulability matters
(to the extent it does) as well as the specific problems arising when modeling
race. Manipulability matters to the extent that when a variable cannot be ma-
nipulated independently of others, the distinction between causal and evidential
relevance collapses. In the context of race, the question becomes one of whether
it is possible to distinguish between someone’s race being evidence for an out-
come and its bringing about that outcome. It appears that, depending on the
context and the query, this distinction is only sometimes coherent, but, to the
extent it is, causal reasoning has a role to play. An account of the causal status
of race should have something to say about the cases that can and cannot be
modeled causally.
A general challenge in researching the causal status of race involves de-
termining how to combine the methodological literature on causal modeling
with social scientific work on race. Both Sen and Wasow (2016) and Kohler-
Hausmann (2018) draw on conclusions about the relationship between the ma-
nipulability of race and its status as a social construct. For Sen and Wasow,
the socially constructed nature of race is reflected in its being a cluster concept.
For Kohler-Hausmann, the key fact is that race can only be fully understood
as part of a socially constructed system of meanings. The forgoing discussion
provides reason to be cautious of drawing any direct inferences from the so-
cial constructedness of race to its (non-)manipulability. That race functions as
a social construct is less important than how it does. I’ve proposed that the
reason that race eludes manipulability is that it is understood within society
as having an existence independent of its particular manifestations. This is a
particular claim about how the concept functions within the society and it is
further important for understanding why it would be limiting to insist that one
treat it as reducing to the signals that are in fact manipulated.
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In the process of working through the philosophical and methodological is-
sues involved in causally interpreting race, it is important that this research
should aid rather than hinder experimental work on detecting racial discrimina-
tion. Audit studies offer a good experimental design for testing for a particular
type of discrimination in particular contexts. The fact that the proposals re-
viewed in this paper make such studies more difficult to interpret suggests that
something has gone wrong. The signal manipulation proposal provides a frame-
work within which to continue to explore the thornier methodological questions
without losing sight of what goes right in existing experiments. It straightfor-
wardly yields the result that one can test for the effects of race by intervening
upon its signals, but that one does not need to understand the effect as being
simply that of the signals themselves. This is an important feature of audit
studies that has been lost in prior theorizing, and the question of how much the
signal manipulation proposal can be generalized beyond simple experimental
designs is a fruitful starting point for further work. The category-signal rela-
tionship is not an ordinary causal one. But the conclusion to draw is not that we
should avoid discussing such relationships, but rather that by analyzing them
more carefully, we can gain insight into the particular challenges in causally
understanding race.
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